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I. INTRODUCTION
Somehow, the Endangered Species Act (ESA)' just keeps chugging
along, throwing everyone surprises. In a rare moment of environmental
consensus, Congress adopted and President Richard Nixon signed 2 the 1973
legislation that remains the core of the ESA, providing "a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species de-
pend may be conserved.",3 But it was the Supreme Court-and a tiny fish-
that put the statute on the map a few years later, when the Court decided the
statute meant what Congress said and ordered the federal government "to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.
'
* Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, The Florida State University College of Law,
Tallahassee, Florida. I am thankful to participants in the Public Lands and Resources Law conference at
Montana for their helpful input, and to Bridget Kellogg for research assistance. Please direct all com-
ments or questions about this Article to jruhl@law.fsu.edu. This article is based on my speech at the
Twenty-Seventh Annual Public Land and Resources Law Conference, at the University of Montana
School of Law, Missoula, Montana.
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000). This Article is not intended to
provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA. For that, see Lawrence R. Liebesman and Rafe Petersen,
Endangered Species Deskbook (2003); Endangered Species Act: Law, Policy, and Perspectives (Donald
C. Baur & Win. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter Law, Policy, and Perspectives]; Stanford Environ-
mental Law Society, The Endangered Species Act (2001) [hereinafter SELS]; Tony A. Sullins, Endan-
gered Species Act (2001); Michael J. Bean & Melanie J. Rowland, The Evolution of National Wildlife
Law (3d ed., 1997).
2. There was little debate over the bills in either house, nearly unanimous support in the final
votes in Congress, and rapid endorsement by President Nixon. For a concise history of the enactment of
the ESA and its subsequent amendments, see SELS, supra n. 1, at 14-26.
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
4. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1978). The Court refused to allow equi-
table considerations to relieve the TVA from its duty under the ESA to ensure that construction and
operation of a dam would not jeopardize the continued existence of the endangered snail darter. The
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Well, that did not happen, but over time the statute nonetheless became
known as the "pit bull" of environmental laws. Sentiment against the big
bad ESA grew steadily to the point where it was slated to be "gutted" when
Republicans took control of Congress in the mid-1990s. 6 That did not hap-
pen either, because Bruce Babbitt, the Secretary of the Interior appointed by
President Bill Clinton, decided to reform the statute to make it friendlier to
property owners, which took the wind out of the legislative reform sails.7
Later, to improve conditions for two species of sucker fish and a population
of salmon, the Secretary of the Interior appointed by President George W.
Bush decided to cut off federal irrigation water supplies to several hundred
farmers in Oregon, who saw their farms turn to dust.
8
If this is beginning to sound a bit strange, get used to it. The ESA is not
like any other environmental law, 9 and its thirty-year history has repeatedly
defied convention. So, although I was quite happy to accept the invitation to
open the Twenty-Seventh Annual Public Lands and Resources Law Con-
ference, the topic of which was "The Endangered Species Act: Regulatory
and Incentive-Based Alternatives in the West," I wasn't quite sure what to
make of my assigned task: "[T]o open the conference.. .with a sixty to
ninety minute overview of the ESA's major decisions and provisions,
Court observed that the "plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost," and that in this regard the ESA "admits of no excep-
tion." Id. at 184-85. The case has been described as a "ringing endorsement of the environmentalists'
proposition (and the basis of their empowerment strategy) that if citizens are able to prove a statutory
violation, the court must enforce the law without equitable balancing." Zygmunt l.B. Plater et al., Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 681-82 (2d ed., West Group 1998). For thoughtful
accounts of the case, including its historical preludes and aftermath, see Oliver Houck, Unfinished
Stories, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 867, 921-942 (2002); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Po-
litical Ecosystem-Coping With the Reality of Politics, 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 423, 423-71 (2002).
5. See e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, Envtl. F., Sep.-Oct. 1998, at 55.
6. For a summary, see SELS, supra n. 1, at 22-30.
7. For comprehensive and thoughtful "insider" accounts of this aspect of Secretary Babbitt's
tenure at Interior, see John D. Leshey, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of Interior: A Preliminary
View, 31 Envtl. L. Rev. 199 (2001); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law At the Turn of the Century; A
Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary History, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2375 (2000).
8. For the legal and social history leading to the Klamath River Basin events, as told from several
different perspectives, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in
the Klamath Basin, 30 Ecology L.Q. 279, 325 (2003); Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an
Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 Tulane Envtl. L.J. 197 (2002);
Julia Meudeking, Taking the Heart of the Klamath Basin: Is it Free?, 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 217 (2003);
Cori S. Parobek, Of Farmers' Takes and Fishes' Takings: Fifth Amendment Compensation Claims
When the Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 177
(2003).
9. Because of this quality, "the act just didn't look like other legislation." Charles C. Mann &
Mark L. Plummer, Noah's Choice: The Future of Endangered Species 161 (1st ed., Knopf 1995) (em-
phasis in original). Although Congress may not have been aware of the ramifications of the ESA's
different look, congressional staffers and others close to the drafting and enactment of the original
version of the ESA have suggested that they both understood and intended the different look to carry the
ESA where other laws enacted in the same time period had not ventured. See id. at 156-62.
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and.. .your perspectives on emerging and future ESA issues."' 0 Sure, no
problem, I can do that in sixty to ninety minutes!
As the conference date drew nearer, the magnitude of my topic became
clearer and I began to panic. Then it occurred to me that what has mattered
most to the law of the ESA and what I should try to convey, is what peo-
ple-lawyers, to be specific-have said matters through the statute's his-
tory. I recalled that the American Bar Association section covering envi-
ronmental law had devoted two complete issues of its excellent journal,
Natural Resources & Environment (NR&E), to the ESA, once in 199311 and
then again in 2001.2 1 thought that these two journal issues, compilations of
what two different sets of academics and practitioners thought most impor-
tant to convey about the ESA in their respective time periods, would serve
as useful reference points for my identification of what has mattered most
under the ESA.
My initial idea was to compare the topics covered in the two issues and
formulate some way of explaining why the two sets of topics changed so
much over the eight years separating the two journal issues. Much to my
surprise, I found that the topics had not changed at all. The names and faces
changed. The cases discussed were different. The places where it all hap-
pened were different. But the topics-the basic themes of discussion-were
exactly the same. How could it be that a statute with such an unusual and
tumultuous history had, at two points eight years apart, produced two full-
length journals covering the same topics?
As I thought about it, the reason became clear. The themes covered in
these two journal issues are the issues that drive the ESA year in and year
out, because they are issues that will never be resolved. I'm no pessimist by
nature, but it strikes me that as long as we humans are on the planet doing
our thing, we are going to place some other species in peril. And there is a
set of issues that inevitably will be presented under those circumstances,
which have to do with how we respond through law to the prospect of our
impact on other species. Indeed, I expect that twenty years from now, at the
Forty-Seventh Annual Public Land and Resources Law Conference cover-
ing the fiftieth anniversary of the ESA, some speaker will focus on the same
topics as I am about to cover.
So, this article is designed to convince readers that the past, present, and
future trends of the ESA are all the same. To provide context, Part I pre-
sents a brief overview of the structure of the statute and the kinds of deci-
sions that must be made under it. Part II delves more deeply into each of the
topics covered in the NR&E issues, eight in all, providing in each case the
10. Letter from Ryan Lutey, Public Lands & Resources Law Review Editor in Chief, to J.B. Ruhl
(June 10, 2003).
It. See Symposium, Endangered Species Protection, 8 Nat. Resources & Env. 3 (Summer 1993).
12. See Symposium, Implementing Endangered Species Protection, 16 Nat. Resources & Env. 59
(Fall 2001).
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necessary legal background followed by a discussion of how the topic
played out in the two NR&E issues. Finally, I conclude with a brief sum-
mary of my own perspectives on how these eight themes will continue to
evolve in Congress, the agencies, and the courts.
II. SETING
13
The ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior, who acts through the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Secretary of Commerce, who acts
through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), to make various
decisions about the status and protection of animal and plant species.1
4
FWS and NMFS administer several core programs in that regard, the details
of which are explored more fully later in the article:
e Section 4 authorizes FWS and NMFS to identify "endan-
gered" and "threatened" species, known as the "listing"
function,' 5 and then to designate "critical habitat"' 6 and de-
velop "recovery plans" for the species.1
7
9 Section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that ac-
tions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not "jeopardize"
the continued existence of listed species or "adversely
modify" their critical habitat.' 8
* Section 9 requires that all persons, including all private
and public entities subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid
"taking" listed species of fish and wildlife.' 9
13. I have had the pleasure of being asked to make presentations and write commentary for publi-
cation about the ESA more than several times. Out of necessity, the materials in this "background"
section of this Article are a variation, tailored for the instant purposes, of a template I have developed
and used several times in order to set the stage for in-depth discussion of different aspect of the ESA
program. Similar background treatments appear elsewhere in my published work.
14. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15) (defining Secretary) and 1533(a)(2) (division of responsibility); 50
C.F.R. § 424.01 (2004) (FWS and NMFS joint regulations). FWS generally is responsible for terrestrial
and freshwater species. while NMFS is responsible for marine and anadromous species. NMFS is also
known as National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). For a description of the listing process, see SELS, supra n. 1, at 38-58;
Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 15-20; Sullins, supra n. 1, at 11-25; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the
ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection Law, Law, Policy, and Perspectives, supra n. 1, at 19.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). For a description of the critical habitat designation process, see SELS,
supra n. I, at 59-69; Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 20-24; Sullins, supra n. 1, at 26-28; Federico
Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat, Law, Policy, and Perspectives, supra n. 1, at 47.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). For a description of the recovery plan process, see SELS, supra n. 1, at
71-77; Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 24-26; Sullins, supra n. 1, at 34-18; John M. Volkman,
Recovery Planning, Law, Policy, and Perspectives, supra n. 1, at 71.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). For a description of the consultation process, see SELS, supra n. 1, at
83-103; Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 27-39; Sullins, supra n. 1, at 59-86; Marilyn Averill,
Protecting species through Interagency Cooperation, Law, Policy, and Perspectives, supra n. 1, at 87.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). For a description of the cases developing the legal standards for what
constitutes "take," see SELS, supra n. 1, at 104-112; Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 39-45; Sul-
lins, supra n. 1, at 44-53; Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and Section 9, Law, Policy, and Perspectives,
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e Sections 7 (for federal actions) and 10 (for actions not
subject to Section 7) establish a procedure and criteria for
FWS and NMFS to approve "incidental taking" of listed
20
species.
A reader unfamiliar with the ESA may find its structure quite simple and
its application quite straightforward. Indeed, by comparison to other federal
environmental laws, the ESA is streamlined, almost brief.21 The core pro-
grams seem to fit together neatly: (1) identify problem species and their
essential habitat areas; (2) stop public and private actions from further sig-
nificantly deteriorating their condition; (3) allow actions that kill or injure
species members only under strict permitting guidelines; and (4) figure out
ways to help them recover to sustainable populations. Seems like a good
game plan.
As is often the case with seemingly uncomplicated statutes, however, the
devil is in the details. Each of the administrative programs outlined above
involves an intersection between legal standards and a multitude of scien-
tific determinations. The problem is not one simply of uncertainty for lack
of data, though that is surely a driver in the difficulties of ESA administra-
tion. Rather, the fit between the two domains is often not very tight even
when available data is robust by scientific standards. The legal standards
call for determinations that scientists usually are reluctant to make, and the
information and analysis science produces often leads to inconclusive out-
comes under the legal standards. Consider the following inventory of some
of the coupled law-science decisions FWS and NMFS are required to make
under the ESA:
supra n. 1, at 191; Steven P. Quarles and Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities "Take"
Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the "Harm" Regulation?, Law, Policy, and Perspectives,
supra n. 1, at 207.
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4) and 1539(a)(1). "Incidental take," although not the subject of a spe-
cific statutory definition provision, is described elsewhere in the statute as a take that is "incidental to,
and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The
FWS and NMFS have adopted this meaning for purposes of the regulations implementing Section 7. 50
C.F.R. § 402.02. For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures, see SELS, supra n. 1,
at 127-73; Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 46-50; Sullins, supra n. 1, at 87-102.
21. In one unannotated collection of environmental statutes, the ESA took up 44 pages compared
to 181 pages for the Clean Water Act and 304 pages for the Clean Air Act. See Robert V. Percival,
Environmental Law: Statutory Supplement and Internet Guide (2002).
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22. These are the definitions of endangered species and threatened species. See 16 U.S.C. §§
1532(6), (20).
23. For a discussion of this seemingly straightforward question, see infra n.s 56-61 and accompa-
nying text.
24. This and the remaining questions posed for the listing function are taken from the statutory
criteria. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E).
25. This is taken from the definition of critical habitat. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5).
26. This and the other critical habitat designation questions are summarized in the agency regula-
tions. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(1)-(5).
27. This is taken from the definition of "conservation," which is what recovery plans are supposed
to accomplish. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(3), 1534(f) (definition of "conservation" and "recovery plans are
for conservation of species" respectively).
28. These questions are from the statutory procedure for recovery plan development. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(0.
Program Legal Standard Science Questions
Section 4: Is the species in danger of extinc- Is it a species?23 What is its
Listing tion throughout all or a significant range? What are the present and
portion of its range (endangered) threatened injuries to its habitat?2 4
or likely to become so in the Is it being over-utilized for com-
foreseeable future (threatened)? 22  mercial or other purposes? Is it
threatened by disease or preda-
tion? Overall, are these threats
enough to cause it to go extinct?
When? What is the probability?
Section 4: What habitat is essential to the How much space does the species
Critical Habitat conservation of the species and need for individual and popula-
Designation requires special management tion growth? 26 What are its food,
considerations? 25  water, air, light, mineral, shelter
and other nutritional and physio-
logical requirements? Where does
it breed, reproduce and rear off-
spring? What are the constitutive
elements of habitat serving these
functions and needs? Where is
such habitat? How much of it
does the species require?
Section 4: What measures are necessary to What site-specific and general
Recovery bring the species to the point at management actions can reduce
Planning which it is no longer endangered the threats that caused the species
or threatened, and by what objec- to be listed?2 8 How will we meas-
tive, measurable criteria can that ure the magnitude of those bene-
determination be made?27  fits? When will the benefits have
reached the point that we can
justify removing the species from
the lists?
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29. This is the statutory prohibition of jeopardy. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The agency regula-
tions elaborate on the statute with this definition of "jeopardize." See 50 C.F.R.. § 402.02.
30. These are the criteria set forth in the regulatory definition. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
31. This is the statutory prohibition of adverse modification. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
32. The agency regulations elaborate on the statute with this definition of "adverse modification."
See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
33. These are the criteria set forth in the regulatory definition. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
34. This is the statutory definition of take. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
35. This is the regulatory definition of harm. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
36. This is the statutory standard for issuance of a Section 7 incidental take statement. See 16 §
U.S.C. 1536(b)(4).
Program Legal Standard Science Questions
Section 7: Will the direct and indirect effects What are the impacts of the action
Jeopardy of the federal action jeopardize on reproduction, numbers, or
Prohibitions the continued existence of the distribution of the species? 30 How
species by appreciably reducing much do such impacts reduce the
its chances of recovery and sur- chances of the species surviving
vival in the wild? 29  and recovering in the wild?
Section 7: Will the direct and indirect effects How does the action alter any of
Adverse of the federal action result in the the physical and biological fea-
Modification destruction or adverse modifica- tures that were the basis for de-
Prohibition tion of critical habitat of the spe- termining the habitat to be criti-
cies 31 by appreciably diminishing cal? 33 How much do such impacts
the value of the habitat for the reduce the chances of the species
survival and recovery of the spe- surviving and recovering in the
cies?3 2  wild?
Section 9: Will a person's action harass, Does the action actually kill or
Take harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, injure wildlife? For the "harm"
Prohibition kill, trap, capture, or collect any determination, does it modify or
individuals of the species? 34  degrade habitat so as to impair
behavioral patterns such as breed-
ing, feeding, or sheltering, and if
so, has that killed or injured indi-
viduals of the species?
35
Section 7: What reasonable and prudent What is the nature and magnitude
Incidental Take measures are necessary or appro- of the take being authorized, and
Permitting priate to minimize the impact of by what measures and magnitude
the incidental taking?36  has the agency minimized such
take?
2004]
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Program Legal Standard Science Questions
Section 10: Has the applicant minimized and What is the nature and magnitude
Incidental Take mitigated the impacts of the inci- of the take being authorized, and
Permitting dental taking to the maximum by what measures and magnitude
extent practicable, and not appre- has the applicant minimized and
ciably reduced the likelihood of mitigated such take? What is the
the survival and recovery of the net effect of the take, as mini-
species? 37  mized and mitigated, on the abil-
ity of the species to survive and
recover?
This illustration presents only the tip of the iceberg. Any one of the sci-
ence questions could be unpacked to reveal a wealth of additional inquiries,
pressing even harder on the question of how to make the call under the legal
standard. There is much work to be done and many decisions to be made
under the ESA.' It should be no surprise to find the statute has presented a
rich diet of comllex and often controversial issues. The next section of this
article delves more deeply into the dominant themes that have emerged
from this mix of science and law and which have remained remarkably con-
stant as the driving forces behind the development of the ESA.
III. EIGHT THEMES OF ESA HISTORY
As this is the thirtieth anniversary of the ESA, I expect to see a good
number of efforts to pull the experience together into some coherent his-
tory, and many different ways of doing so. One approach might be to run
through the "big cases. 38 Another could be to identify the "phases" or "pe-
riods" of the ESA. 39 My approach was to focus on the last ten years-the
period I believe has had the greatest influence on where the ESA is today
and where it is headed-and ask what mattered to people working with the
ESA at different points in that time frame. The two issues of NR&E provide
convenient and illuminating reference points for that purpose. They reveal a
set of themes that have remained constant over the time frame, but have
provided a rich context for the evolution of ESA administration and litiga-
tion.
A. Identifying Imperiled Species and Their Critical Habitat
Most of the ESA's machinery works only with respect to a species that
has been "listed '4° as "endangered '41 or "threatened. 42 Section 4 of the
37. These are the statutory criteria for issuance of a Section 10 incidental take permit. See 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2).
38. See Daniel A. Farber, A Tale of Two Cases, 20 Va. Envtl. L. J. 33 (2001) (comparing TVA v.
Hill and Sweet Home, two Supreme Court ESA cases discussed herein at supra n. 4 and infra n. 99).
39. Something I have tried in the past. See J.B. Ruhl, Phase Three of the ESA: Using Endangered
Species Protection as a Natural Resource Management Tool, 6 Nat. Resources & Env. 38 (Winter
1992).
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to maintain the lists).
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ESA governs this listing function, as well as the requirement that FWS
and NMFS designate "critical habitat" 44 of species that they list. The listing
and critical habitat designation functions are, in administrative law terms,
rulemaking,45 and can be initiated with a citizen petition or from within the
agency.4
Although the ESA has been in place for thirty years, far more species
have been added to the list than removed. Currently, over 390 animals and
600 plants found in the United States are listed as endangered and over 130
animals and 150 plants in the United States are threatened.47 These figures
are disturbing enough, but even more so when one considers that only four-
teen species have been removed from the lists because they have "recov-
ered,, 48 seven have been removed because they have become extinct,49 and
only 450 listed species have had critical habitat designated. 5  Moreover, the
trend continues, with twenty-seven animal species already proposed for
listing and another 117 considered good candidates; four plants proposed
for listing and 139 in candidate status.5' Hence, it should be no surprise that
as the number of listed species has grown, the issues, surrounding the listing
and critical habitat programs have become more coptentious.
In 1993, I provided the NR&E issue installment on the listing and critical
habitat designation programs.52 My theme at the time was that there had
been relatively little judicial review up to that point under Section 4,53 but
the dam was probably about to burst. There had been an increase in cases in
which courts found FWS or NMFS had corhimitted procedural errors, such
as missed deadlines or failed to fulfill procedural requirements under other
41. A species is endangered if it "is in danger 6f extinction throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." 16 U.S.C. §1532(6).
42. A species is threatened if it "is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of itg range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
43. See 16 U.S.C. 1533.
44. "Critical habitat" is comprised of "specific areas.. .on which are found those physical and
biological features (1) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special
management considerations or protection." 16 U.S.C. 1532(5(A)(i).
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) ("The Secretary shall by regulation...").
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (citizen petition procedures) Most listings follow on the heels of
citizen petitions.
47. For a chart updating the figures on a monthly basis, see FWS, Summary of Listed Species and
Recovery Plans as of 09/1/2003, http://ecos.FWS.gov/tess-public/html/boxscore.html (accessed Sept.
18, 2003).
48. See FWS, Delisted Species Report, http://ecos.FWS.gov/tess-public/TESSWebpageDe-
listed?listings--O (accessed Sept. 18, 2003).
49. See FWS, Delisted Species Report, http://ecos.FWS.gov/tess-publicfTSSWebpageDe-
listed?listings=0 (accessed Sept. 18, 2003):
50. See FWS, General Statistics for Endangered Species, http://ecos.FWS.gov/tess-pub-
lic/TessStatReport (accessed Sept. 18, 2003).
51. See id.
52. See J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA-The Cornerstone of Species Protection Law, 8 Nat. Re-
sources & Env. 26 (Summer 1993).
53. My take was that "until recently...judicial examination of the ESA § 4 programs was insignifi-
cant."
2004]
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laws, but very few cases had overruled a listing or critical habitat rule on
substantive grounds.54 I suggested, however, that the "intensified focus on
the importance of listing and other Section 4 programs virtually guarantees
",55
that many more cases will follow soon.
It is so nice to be right! Unfortunately, being right in this case meant wit-
nessing a tsunami of litigation under Section 4. In 2001, three different arti-
cles in the NR&E issue were devoted to the Section 4 programs and the
snarl of litigation and other conundrums they had engendered. The issues
have become more nuanced, diverse and complicated than when I surveyed
the handful of cases out there in 1993, but they all boil down to the hard
cold fact that the ESA machinery pulls into gear only when Section 4 dic-
tates.
As an example of the nuances we now see under the ESA, one 2001 in-
stallment dealt with the practice of listing "distinct breeding populations"
(DPS) as species.56 -The legal definition of species under the ESA strikes
many scientists as nonsensical. 57 The ESA defines species to include "any
subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment
of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when ma-
ture. ' 8 Scientists have enough trouble defining a species; now they must
also define subspecies and distinct population segments, matters sure to
engender yet more debate. 59 FWS and NMFS have a many-paged policy
document that attempts to sort through these issues, with marginal suc-
cess.60 Expand these questions beyond the halls of science to the policy
context of ESA implementation, and the combative array of ESA interest
groups have unleashed a wave of litigation challenging listing decisions
around the nation, fighting tooth-and-nail over the species question alone.6'
Another huge litigation front that has opened under Section 4 involves
critical habitat designations. As noted ESA practitioners Murray Feldman
54. See id. at 68-70.
55. Id. at 70.
56. See Kate Geoffrey and Thomas Doyle, Listing Distinct Breeding Segments of Endangered
Species: Has It Gone Too Far?, 16 Nat. Resources & Env. 82 (2001).
57. As two close observers of the ESA have put it, "the ESA requires scientists to provide clear
answers to fuzzy questions that many scientists do not define as 'scientific,' such as whether a species is
endangered or whether a specific project is likely to cause jeopardy." Doremus & Tarlock, supra n. 8,
325.
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
59. For a discussion of the debate surrounding how to define a species, both legally and scientifi-
cally, see SELS, supra n. 1, at 31-38; Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 11-15; Sullins, supra n. 1, at
6-11; Doremus, supra n. 8, at 1087-1112.
60. See Geoffrey & Doyle, supra n. 56, at 86-87.
61. Several cases turn on whether FWS or NMFS has correctly defined what constitutes a species
within the meaning of the statute. See Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 11-15 (reviewing cases). For
a recent study documenting many of the Section 4 cases, see U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-
803, Fish and Wildlife Service Uses Best Available Science to Make Listing Decisions, but Additional
Guidance Needed for Critical Habitat Designations, 15-16 (2003).
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and Mike Brennan explained in their article in the 2001 NR&E issue,62 in
addition to a wave of suits involving missed statutory deadlines for critical
habitat designations, "both the protection provided by and the analysis re-
quired for critical habitat designation are coming under increased judicial
,,63scrutiny. The wave of litigation has become so intense and costly, FWS
describes it as having nothing short of debilitating effects on the agency's
ability to carry out its conservation mission. 64
Finally, in an article illustrating the interplay between Section 4 and the
regulatory provisions of the ESA, Madeline June Kass explained in the
2001 NR&E issue how Section 4(d) of the statute, governing the listing of
species as threatened, could provide greater statutory flexibility.65 When
animal species are listed as endangered, the take prohibition of Section 9
applies automatically and fully-it leaves little discretion to FWS and
NMFS as to how to regulate activities that might cause a taking of the spe-
cies. By contrast, under Section 4(d) FWS and NMFS have the discretion to
prescribe the level of take protection afforded species listed as threatened.
Kass described how FWS and NMFS have increasingly turned to this op-
tion as a means of relieving the angst associated with Section 9, by crafting
complex rules under Section 4(d) detailing activities that are and are not
prohibited under Section 9.66 Of course, the success of this tactic depends
on there being scientific credibility for designating the species as threat-
ened. Not surprisingly, therefore, this new approach, while "creative and
fresh, 67 is controversial.
62. See Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of Critical Habitat
for Species Conservation, 16 Nat. Resources & Env. 88 (Fall 2001).
63. Id. at 88.
64. See U.S Department of the Interior News, Endangered Species Act "Broken "-Flood of Litiga-
tion Over Critical Habitat Hinders Species Conservation (May 28, 2003) (press release). The agency
has testified about this problem before Congress:
Simply put, the listing and critical habitat program is now operated in a "first to the court-
house" mode, with each new court order or settlement taking its place at the end of an
ever-lengthening line. We are no longer operating under a rational system that allows us to
prioritize resources to address the most significant biological needs. I should note that it is
a direct result of this litigation that we have had to request a critical habitat listing subcap
in our appropriations request the last several fiscal years in order to protect the funding for
other ESA programs.
Testimony of Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks, Department of
the Interior, Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Regarding the Designation of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered
Species Act (April 10, 2003) http://laws.FWS.gov/ TESTIMON/2003/2003aprillO.html (accessed Nov.
4, 2003).
65. See Madeline June Kass, Threatened Extinction of Plain Vanilla 4(d) Rules, 16 Nat. Resources
& Env. 78 (Fall 2001).
66. See id. at 79-81.
67. Id. at 133.
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B. What to Make of the Toothless Recovery Plan Program
The point of the ESA is not to list species, but to rescue them from their
imperiled state. The ESA provides several tools for doing so, some that
have sharp regulatory teeth and others that do not. One tool in the latter
category is provided in Section 4(f) of the statute, under which FWS and
NMFS must "develop and implement plans (hereinafter 'recovery plans')
for the conservation and survival" of each species they list.68 The goal of
"conservation" is "to use all methods and procedures which are necessary
to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which
the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. 69
So, recovery planning is designed to have FWS and NMFS lay out the con-
servation game plan. From there, however, the courts have interpreted re-
covery plans to have no mandatory effect on federal agencies, much less
anyone else.70 They are plans, and nothing more.
This limitation has seriously complicated recovery plan implementation,
particularly in the case of species with large-scale habitat needs. For exam-
ple, it speaks volumes that in his 1993 NR&E article on recovery programs
in the Upper Colorado River Basin, Peter Evans never once mentions Sec-
tion 4(f)0.71 The "recovery program" about which he wrote was in reality a
regulatory program that had morphed into a "partnership" between FWS
and the three affected states.72 Eight years later, Professor Fred Cheever
meticulously chronicled the failure of recovery planning to amount to any-
thing in terms of force of law.73 He outlined the case for using recovery
plans to guide implementation of the other ESA programs, including those
that do have regulatory force. He noted the influence recovery plans have
had on judicial determinations of such matters as whether an activity causes
take, whether an activity jeopardizes a species, and whether a species
should be reclassified from endangered to threatened.74 It remains to be
seen, however, whether these are isolated instances of a court using recov-
ery plans as a convenient source of evidence, or whether, as Cheever put it,
the courts are building recovery plans into "the context in which all provi-
sions of the ESA will be applied to specific species. 75 Two years after his
article, the recovery plan program remains gums in search of teeth.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
70. See Liebesman & Petersen, supra n. 1, at 25-26; SELS, supra n. 1, at 76-77.
71. See Peter H. Evans, The "Recovery" Partnership for the Upper Colorado River to Meet § 7
Needs, 8 Nat. Resources & Env. 24 (Summer 1993).
72. See id. at 24-25, 71.
73. See Federico Cheever, Recovery Planning, the Courts and the Endangered Species Act, 16 Nat.
Resources & Env. 106, 108-110 (Fall 2001).
74. See id. at 110-11, 135.
75. Id. at 135.
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C. The Ever-Expanding Scope of Section 7 Consultation
Some of the tools the ESA makes available for species conservation have
far more regulatory weight than is found in the recovery plan program. A
bulwark in this respect is Section 7(a)(2) of the statute, which places a se-
ries of restrictions on actions carried out, funded or authorized by federal
agencies.76 Such actions may neither be "likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species," nor "result in
the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat., 77  These re-
strictions are backed up by a highly articulated "consultation" procedure
that requires each federal "action agency" to verify the impacts of their ac-
tions with FWS and NMFS (the "consulting agencies").78 If the consulting
agency determines that listed species may be present in the area of such
proposed action, the action agency prepares a "biological assessment"
evaluating whether any such species is "likely to be affected by such ac-
tion., 79 The consulting agency uses the biological assessment, and other
information available to it, to render an opinion as to whether the action
will cause jeopardy or adverse modification. If those effects are found, the
consulting agency must develop reasonable alternatives that will allow the
action agency to accomplish the intended purpose of the proposed action
without crossing the jeopardy/adverse modification line.8°
The consultation procedure is what ended the ESA's honeymoon, when
the Supreme Court ruled in 1979 that the prospect of wiping out the snail
darter, a small minnow, meant an almost completed federally built dam
could proceed no further.81 Congress added an escape valve to the "no jeop-
ardy" mandate after the Court's opinion, in the form of a narrow but con-
troversial "exemption" process,82 but that procedure has defused very few
cases. 83 Rather, the Section 7(a)(2) consultation process, given the number
of federal decisions it touches, 84 has fed the ESA a steady diet of contro-
versy.
76. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)-(c).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c).
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
81. See supra n. 4 and accompanying text.
82. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p).
83. See SELS, supra n. 1, at 101-02. For a detailed review of the small handful of matters that have
even reached the level of exemption review, much less been granted an exemption, see Patrick A. Par-
enteau, The Exemption Process and the "God Squad," Law, Policy, and Perspectives, supra n. 1, at 131,
143-51.
84. One study found that for the period 1987-1992,FWS conducted over 70,000 consultations. See
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of
Interior and Commerce, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277, 318-19 (1993). Similarly, FWS reports that in the
period 1998-2001, it conducted over 219,000 consultations. FWS, Consultations with Federal Agencies:
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act 2 (February 2002), (available at http://endangered.FWS.govl
consultations/consultations.pdf).
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As the reach of the federal government grows, the number of private ac-
tivities it funds or authorizes grows as well, meaning that the scope of Sec-
tion 7 consultations expands in stride. This was the chord three ESA practi-
tioners struck in the 1993 NR&E issue, in which they focused on the poten-
tial for abuse of the consultation process by FWS and NMFS.85 Under its
"may affect" standard for initiation of consultation, Section 7(a)(2) can
"grab" a project at relatively low thresholds in terms of effect on species,
even though its full regulatory force is not in play unless the project will
jeopardize the species. And truth be told, FWS and NMFS know they have
the benefit of considerable judicial deference on review of their consulta-
tion decisions. Might they use the consultation process strategically to ex-
tract development concessions they might not otherwise be able to obtain
through other ESA programs? The evidence says yes, the authors alleged,
as the article described a case in which FWS declared that a private project
requiring approval from other federal agencies would jeopardize a listed
beach mouse species, thus leading to substantial mitigation concessions by
the private developer.86 In separate litigation, however, an environmental
group's claim that the project would illegally take the beach mouse was
thrown out of court for lack of evidence.87 How, one might reasonably
query, could the project have jeopardized the continued existence of the
entire species if it would not take a single individual of the species? The
authors concluded this was an example of abuse of agency power under
Section 7(a)(2).88
By 2001, with hundreds of additional species listed and the growth of
federal regulatory programs unabated, the Section 7(a)(2) tentacles had
grown longer and stronger.89 For example, William Stelle's article in the
2001 NR&E issue detailed the utterly complex interaction between Section
7(a)(2) and other federal laws in the area of the Pacific Northwest states
affected by numerous salmon population listings.90 Salmon and their
aquatic and riparian habitat course throughout this part of the nation, carry-
ing the ESA and section 7(a)(2) consultation requirements, it seems, to
every comer. Stelle explained how this has complicated federal programs
governing industrial discharges, runoff controls, waste cleanups, power
generation, pipelines and just about anything affecting water.91 He con-
cluded that "ESA consultations are becoming the critical path for a wide
85. See William H. Satterfield, Glenn G. Waddell, and Matthew W. Bowden, Who's Afraid of the
Big Bad Beach Mouse? 8 Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. Rev. 13 (Summer 1993).
86. See id. at 14.
87. See id. at 14-15.
88. See id.
89. See supra n. 29.
90. See William Stelle, Jr., Implementing ESA Salmon Listings-Untangling Overlapping Pro-
grams, 16 Nat. Resources & Env. 112 (Fall 2001).
91. Seeidatll2-117.
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variety of federal actions, permits and approvals, '92 a prognosis that shows
no signs of being reversed.
D. What "Harms" a Species?
As strong a dose as Section 7(a)(2) provides for species conservation, it
pales by comparison to the so-called "take" prohibition found in Section 9
of the ESA, which ranks as one of the most powerful and broadly applica-
ble statements of the precautionary principle on the books. Section 9(a)(1)
of the ESA instructs that, except as provided elsewhere in the ESA,93 "with
respect to any endangered species of fish...it is unlawful for any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to...take any such species
within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States. 94 Al-
though the provision has defined limits, 95 where it applies it does so sweep-
ingly and with tremendous force. Persons subject to the prohibition include
all federal, state and local governments and all private organizations and
individuals.96 It applies "within the United States," on public and private
lands alike. And it applies to acts that "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" the protected species.97 Within that list
of prohibited activities, FWS and NMFS have defined "harm" to include
any modification of the species' habitat-in this case not limited to desig-
nated critical habitat-that results in actual death or injury to species mem-
bers.98 As clear and simple as that sounds, the "harm" component of the
take prohibition has vexed the law of the ESA for well over a decade not-
withstanding the Supreme Court's 1995 opinion in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,99 in which the Court approved
the administrative regulation defining the harm component.
In the 1993 NR&E issue, a group of experienced ESA litigators ex-
plained how the stage for Sweet Home had been set.' ° The lower federal
courts lacked consensus at that time over issues such as burden of proof,
whether the regulation applied to populations or individuals, and whether
prospective harm could be enjoined.1' Out of this fog emerged the Sweet
Home litigation, which involved none of these issues-rather, it went
straight to the validity of the harm regulation under the statute. 0 2 At the
92. Id. at 112.
93. For discussion of the exceptions, see infra text accompanying n. 82.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
95. Section 9 does not apply to plant species (see 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)), nor does it automatically
apply to threatened species of fish and wildlife (see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)).
96. All these entities fit the ESA's definition of "person." See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
98. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (FWS definition); 50 C.F.R. part 217 (NMFS definition).
99. 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (herinafter Sweet Home).
100. See Steven P. Quarles, John A. Macleod, and Thomas R. Lundquist, The Unsettled Law of ESA
Takings, 8 Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. Rev. 10 (Summer 1993).
101. See id. at12, 59-61.
102. See id. at 11.
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time the NR&E issue was published, the case was on appeal to the D.C.
Circuit from a district court opinion upholding the regulation.10 3 The au-
thors predicted that the appellate court's "decision should resolve whether
the harm regulation is lawful and, if so, should offer some guidance on
what it means." ° 4 Now there's a laugh!
In 2001, naturally, the focus of attention was the aftermath of the Su-
preme Court's decision in the Sweet Home litigation. It turns out the D.C.
Circuit issued two opinions, the first upholding the regulation as within the
scope of congressional intent, and the second, by the same panel on recon-
sideration, striking down the rule as ultra vires.'0 5 The Supreme Court
landed somewhere in between, upholding the regulation as not outside of
congressional intent, but imposing a variable tort-like burden of proof to the
take analysis. According to the Court, the harm definition extends the take
prohibition from cases in which the action directly causes death or injury
(for example, hunting, shooting and trapping), to cases in which an indirect
causal chain is present-i.e., loss of habitat leads in some way to actual
death or injury "by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."' 10 6 Theories of indirect take cau-
sation can become quite attenuated and speculative, in which case it would
be unreasonable to enforce the take prohibition's rebuttable presumption
against the activity as rigorously as in more obvious cases of direct take.
For example, assume a developer's plan to build a subdivision would locate
new homes in an area within several hundred yards of habitat known to be
occupied by members of a listed bird species, but not in such habitat or any
of the bird's critical habitat. Opponents of the project could argue some of
the residents of the new homes will have cats as pets, some of those cat
owners will allow their cats to wander outdoors, some of those cats may
venture into the bird's habitat, some of those cats may eat birds, and some
of those birds may be individuals of the bird species. Anyone could specu-
late such possibilities, and it would be unreasonable to burden the developer
with proving the postulated scenario is not possible.
10 7
Rather, as the Court pronounced when it upheld the harm definition, in
many cases it is appropriate to impose the burden of proof on the proponent
of the indirect harm theory. Thus, the Court emphasized that the harm rule
must "be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation
and foreseeability"' 0 8 and acknowledged "strong arguments that activities
103. See id. The opinion is styled as Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992).
104. Quarles et al., supra n. 100, at 11.
105. See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
106. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (FWS definition); 50 C.F.R. part 217 (NMFS definition).
107. See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (rejecting ESA citizen suit claim for
injunctive relief based on a similar set of allegations).
108. 515 U.S. at 696-97, n. 9.
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that cause minimal or unforeseeable harm will not violate the [ESA] as con-
strued."' 9 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor was more explicit, limiting
the scope of the harm rule to "significant habitat modification that causes
actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifi-
able protected animals."
' 10
In the 2001 NR&E issue, therefore, prominent ESA practitioners Alan
Glen and Craig Douglas attempted to divine the meaning of Sweet Home as
it had played out in the lower federal courts.1 ' The Court's description of
the issue as one basically of proximate cause frames the analysis in terms
quite similar to those of a classic prima facie tort case.' 1 2 Not surprisingly,
therefore, Glen and Douglas found lower courts have steadfastly refused to
enforce the take prohibition based on attenuated indirect take theories, but
have enjoined case-specific instances of prospective take when death or
injury was proven to be likely." 3
E. Building the Habitat Conservation Plan Program
The "except as provided" clause of the take prohibition refers to Section
10 of the ESA, the statute's "permits" provision.' 4 In particular, Section
10(a)(1) establishes a procedure for FWS and NMFS to approve "incidental
take" of species protected under the take prohibition. Section 10(a)(1) re-
quires agencies to approve actions that will cause take incidental to an oth-
erwise lawful purpose if the applicant submits a habitat conservation plan
(HCP)" 15 satisfying the agency that, among other things, "the applicant will,
to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of
such taking"' 16 and "the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of
the survival and recovery of the species in the wild."" 7 This set of stan-
109. Id. at 699.
110. Id. at 708-09.
111. Alan M. Glen and Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and
Degree, 16 Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. Rev. 65 (2001).
112. For an especially thorough treatment of this topic, likening the Sweet Home standard to that of
a tort claim, see James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law
about Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifi-
ers, 33 Envtl. L. Rev. 595 (2003).
113. See id. at 68-69, 132. For a more recent summary of the history of this administrative interpre-
tation of "harm" and the case law construing it, which confirms what Glen and Douglas predicted, see
Steven G. Davison, The Aftermath of Sweet Home Chapter: Modification of Wildlife Habitat as a Pro-
hibited Taking in Violation of the Endangered Species Act, 27 Win. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol. Rev. 541
(2003).
114. 16U.S.C.§ 1539.
115. The requirements for an HCP are set forth at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A), and are described
supra at the chart text accompanying n.s 36-37. "Incidental take," although not the subject of a specific
statutory definition provision, is described elsewhere in the statute as a take that is "incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The
FWS and NMFS have adopted this meaning for purposes of the regulations implementing Section 7. 50
C.F.R. § 402.02.
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(2)(B)(iv).
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dards allows the agency to condition approvals of case-specific takes on a
scale of practicability; yet ensures no such activity, however much the prac-
ticability standard counsels in favor of allowing the take, may jeopardize
the species' continued existence. Interestingly, although this procedure has
been available in the statute since 1982, by 1990 only a handful of HCP
permits had been requested and issued.' Hence, one of the eight themes I
have identified in my review of ESA history is a relative newcomer.
In an interesting twist, noted ESA practitioner Rob Thornton authored
the HCP article in both the 1993 and the 2001 NR&E issues. In 1993,
Thornton described the infancy of the program and expressed hope that the
incoming Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, could make something of
it."9 Yet he predicted the program's development would be cramped by
lack of funding and the complexities of multiple-landowner, multiple-
species settings in which the ESA often plays out.
20
By 2001, the HCP program had taken off and Thornton spent pages re-
counting how Babbitt made it happen.' 2' One truly has to hand it to Babbitt,
because this was taking place during a time in which the ESA was, let's just
say, unpopular in Congress. His stroke of brilliance was to forge a two-part
agenda employing creative interpretations of ESA authorities.122 One side
of the agenda focused on enhancing species conservation through greater
emphasis of ecosystem-level management of habitat and other resources
vital to the sustainability of imperiled species. 23 The other side of the
agenda focused on providing greater voice and fairness to landowners on
118. By 1992, for example, FWS had issued only 12 HCP permits, whereas it had issued 225 by
October 1, 1997. See Defenders of Wildlife, Frayed Safety Nets: Conservation Planning Under the
Endangered Species Act vi-xiii (1998). For background on these developments and the HCP program in
general, see Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Sur-
prises & the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 371 (1996); Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and the
Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10, 592
(1999); Albert C. Lin, Participants' Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for
Streamlining the Process, 23 Ecology L.Q. 369 (1996); J. B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species,
Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act "HCP" Permits for Real Estate Development, 5
Envtl. Law. 345 (1999); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Tak-
ings & Incentives, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 305 (1997).
119. See Robert D. Thornton, The Search for a Conservation Planning Paradigm: Section 10 of the
ESA, 8 Nat. Resources & Env. 21, 22-23 (Summer 1993).
120. See id. at 23, 65-67.
121. Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships,
16 Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. Rev. 94, 94-98 (Fall 2001).
122. Once again, an insider's account provides a thoughtful perspective on the strategic approach
the Babbitt administration took. See Leshey, supra n. 7, at 212-14.
123. See, e.g., FWS and NMFS, Interagency Policy for the Ecosystem Approach to the Endangered
Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34, 274 (July 1, 1994); George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the
Clinton Administration, 7 Duke Envtl. L & Pol'y F. 39 (1996) (authored by DOI official). For a survey
of the policies the Babbitt administration collected under the ecosystem management theme, see J.B.
Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6
NYU Envtl. L.J. 367, 374-387 (1998).
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whose property the imperiled species are found. 124 This double-barreled
agenda took many forms and led to numerous regulatory innovations.125
The most prominent example of the impact this approach has had on the
ESA is the HCP program, which today is described as "a sweeping new
approach to protecting endangered species.' 26 When Babbitt took over as
Secretary of the Interior, the program was simply not on the radar screen of
landowners or the agency. Babbitt saw it as the perfect medium for resolv-
ing the ever-increasing instances of collision between the ESA take prohibi-
tion and urban growth. Beginning primarily in Austin, Texas and in south-
ern California, the number of HCP permits began to grow in the early
1990s. 127 With experience, the agency added structure and standards to the
program.128 Landowners increasingly participated in HCPs as a means of
resolving ESA issues with lasting certainty, while the agency increasingly
promoted the program as a means of managing species conservation across
ecosystem-level scales. 29 Not surprisingly, therefore, HCP permits began
to proliferate under Babbitt's tenure.
30
Many old school environmentalists objected to this kind of regulatory in-
novation,' 3  but Babbitt not only stuck to the HCP program reforms in the
face of intense opposition from preservationists, 132 he broadened them. As
his administration wound down, it adopted the Candidate Conservation
Agreement mechanism to provide incentives to landowners to conserve
124. See Ruhl, supra n. 123, at 388-400 (survey of policies serving this purpose).
125. For a summary of the status at the time the Bush Administration took over of the various regu-
latory innovations attributable to the Babbitt era, see Eugene H. Buck et al., Congressional Research
Serv. Issue Brief No. 1B 10072, Endangered Species: Difficult Choices 9-12 (June 19, 2002).
126. Farber, supra n. 38, at 38.
127. See Thornton, supra n. 121, at 94-95 (southern California experience).
128. For example, FWS has published a lengthy handbook describing the steps required to obtain an
HCP permit. See Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook (1996) (available at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/
hcpbook.htmi).
129. See Thornton, supra n. 121, at 94-95.
130. As of April 17, 2002, FWS had approved 379 HCPs ranging in scope from a few acres to over
I million acres and covering a total of 30 million acres and 200 listed species. See FWS, Endangered
Species Habitat Conservation Program, http://endangered.FWS.gov/hcp/index.html (accessed April 21,
2004); FWS, Habitat Conservation Planning and the Incidental Take Permitting Process 1 (Nov. 2001)
(available at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/HCPncidentalTake.pdf). For a running count, see FWS,
General Statistics for Endangered Species, http://ecos.FWS.gov/servlet/TessStatReport. For an excellent
statistical summary of the 208 HCP permits that FWS had issued nationally by August 1997, including
acreage statistics, see National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis & American Institute of
Biological Sciences, Using Science in Habitat Conservation Plans (1999) (available at
http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/projects/hcp).
131. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, Frayed Safety Nets: Conservation Planning Under the Endan-
gered Species Act vi-xiii (1998) (pessimistic assessment of the HCP program); John Kostyack, Surprise!
Envtl. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 19 (attorney for National Wildlife Federation presents extensive criticism
of the Babbitt administration's HCP reforms); see generally Thornton, supra n. 121, at 95-96 (describ-
ing other organizations' criticisms).
132. Indeed, some environmental groups have successfully challenged certain limited aspects of the
contract-based HCP reform movement. See Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 2003 WL 22927492
(D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2003).
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habitat of candidate species, 133 and developed the Safe Harbors mechanism
to provide incentives to promote the introduction of habitat of species al-
ready listed. 34 The Bush Administration inherited them as a relatively new
and untested set of polices and thus all eyes, including Thornton's, turned in
2001 to the Department's new leadership. 35 For the most part, the Bush
Administration, under Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton, has held the
course for HCP permitting and related programs.1
36
F. Struggling with the Fit Between Science and the ESA
As noted above, a dominant feature of the ESA is its dependence on
complex scientific findings to make legal decisions. The 1993 NR&E issue
recognized the importance of science to the ESA by devoting an entire arti-
cle to the topic, in which ecologist Robert Taylor provided a thoughtful
account of the difficulties of identifying protectable taxonomic units.
137
Curiously, however, none of the other articles in that issue spent much time
on the science question, devoting their attention primarily to technical legal
questions or sweeping objectives of congressional reform.
By contrast, the science-law interface dominates discussion in many arti-
cles found in the 2001 NR&E issue. Glen and Douglas, for example, iden-
tify scientific debate as central to the determination of what constitutes take
of species under the harm definition, 138 Geoffrey and Doyle delve exten-
sively into the science problems associated with identifying distinct popula-
tion segments, 39 and Feldman and Brennan discuss at length the science
side of critical habitat designations.
40
The difference, I believe, between the early 1990s and early 2000s is that
substantive legal issues had yet to be fully worked out in the 1990s,
133. See Announcement of Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances,
64 Fed. Reg. 32, 726 (June 17, 1999). Candidate Conservation Agreements allow a landowner to take
conservation steps on behalf of species that are candidates for listing in return for an assurance that, if
the species is later listed, the landowner has in place the necessary incidental take authorization to allow
continuation of land uses covered under the agreement.
134. See Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 32, 717 (June 17, 1999). Safe
Harbor agreements allow a landowner to foster conditions suitable for listed species for determined
periods of time in return for an assurance that later development will be allowed on the property to a
level that returns the species' to its "baseline" conditions existing on the property at the time of the
agreement.
135. See Thornton, supra n. 121, at 98-99.
136. For example, the agency recently proposed policies and adopted final regulations strengthening
the Candidate Conservation Agreement and Safe Harbor programs. See Draft Handbook for Candidate
Conservation Agreements with Assurances and Enhancement of Survival Permitting, 68 Fed. Reg.
37170 (June 23, 2003) (available at http://endangered.FWS.gov/candidates/ccaahandbook.html); Safe
Harbor Agreements with Assurances: Revisions to the Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 24084 (May 3, 2004)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
137. See Robert J. Taylor, Biological Uncertainty in the Endangered Species Act, 8 Nat. Resources
& Envtl. L. Rev. 6 (Summer 1993).
138. See Glen & Douglas, supra n. 111, at 69, 132.
139. See Geoffrey & Doyle, supra n. 56, at 87, 133.
140. See Feldman & Brennan, supra n. 62, at 9-93.
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whereas today what largely remains to be determined under the ESA are
methodological issues. In other words, now that the legal framework is
fairly stable, the question of how to use science within that framework has
become a dominant issue. Thus, for example, Congress routinely entertains
(but does not pass) bills designed to instill "sound science" methods into
ESA programs.141 The battle over ESA methodology shows no sign of abat-
ing.
142
G. Reforming the Law
In what today seems like a comical display of political naivet6, the Edito-
rial Board of NR&E in the early 1990s, of which I was a member, almost
declined to devote an issue of the journal to the ESA because we were sure
that legislative overhaul of the statute was imminent and would render our
issue outdated soon after publication. In the end, we gambled on the issue
and covered ourselves by devoting a point-counterpoint pair of articles to
legislative reform. 43 In a heated debate, both authors anticipated what one
called "the conservation fight of the century."' 44 Numerous references to
the outcome of congressional action could be found in many of the other
articles as well.1
45
Of course, no legislative reform occurred then, having been derailed by
Bruce Babbitt's administrative reform gambit discussed above. And pre-
vailing politics keep the ESA in legislative limbo-beyond the reach of
Democrats in the Republican-controlled Congress, but too hot for Republi-
cans to touch. So, with the realization that so much could be done through
administrative innovation, the prospect of congressionally led reform has
withered to nil. In the 2001 NR&E issue, for example, not a single article so
much as suggests that Congress might take on reform of particular ESA
issues, much less a comprehensive effort. Why waste one's breath or ink
discussing the topic. Frankly, I don't bother reading the bills that are filed
anymore. Rather, while the trend of reforming the ESA has not abated, the
forum has shifted from Congress to the agencies, where far more interesting
events have transpired of late. 146
141. See e.g., H.R. 4840, 107
th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 23, 2002). For a more recent version, see
S.369, 108
th Cong, 1V Sess. (Feb. 12, 2003).
142. For an in-depth analysis of this trend, see J.B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act
Methodology, __ Envtl. L. Rev. - (forthcoming).
143. See Willliam Robert Irvin, The Endangered Species Act: Keeping Every Cog and Wheel, 8 Nat.
Resources & Envtl. L. Rev. 36 (Summer 1993) (National Wildlife Federation staff) and Michelle De-
siderio, The ESA: Facing Hard Truths and Advocating Responsible Reform, 8 Nat. Resources & Envtl.
L. Rev. 37 (Summer 1993) (National Association of Home Builders staff).
144. Irvin, supra n. 143, at 76.
145. See, e.g., Quarles et al., supra n. 5, at 61 ("ongoing legislative debates on the sixth reauthoriza-
tion of the ESA may produce a more easily administered taking standard and exemption process").
146. For an in-depth discussion of where FWS may take regulatory innovation of the ESA under the
Bush Administration, see J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the Post-Babbittonian
Era-Are there Any?, - Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. __ (forthcoming).
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H. Defining Values and Objectives
The final of my eight trends permeates the ESA's history, and continues
to define debate in all the other trends-what is it we are trying to accom-
plish, and how far are we willing to go? The range of views on this question
is wider under the ESA than for any other environmental law. Compare this
observation:
If we're going to avert this crisis of extinction, we've got to
think about how to maintain enough space for nature, not
just behind fences but everywhere.
To this one:
Those of you who are responsible for preserving wildlife in
your states know that the ESA is not achieving our shared
goal of recovering endangered species .... [W]e're not get-
ting the job done-either for the species or for private land-
owners impacted by the Act.
Both of these quotes are from the back covers of the NR&E issues I have
used in this article. The first is from Bruce Babbitt when he was Secretary
of the Interior. 147 The second is from Gale Norton when she was Secretary
of the Interior.' 48 The difference between the two is nuanced, but unmistak-
able. And behind these comments, moderated by political protocols, rest
sharply divergent views of the ESA. At the extremes, the ESA is portrayed
as either a toehold for communism or our only hope against global bio-
sphere collapse. 149 Yes, most of us have a "shared goal" of avoiding further
harm to other species; whether and how that goal is balanced against other
goals, however, remains an obstacle to any hope of a shared vision for the
ESA.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict where the ESA will lead from here, except to say
that I am confident the themes I have discussed above will remain at the
core of the statute's evolution. Nevertheless, I will endeavor some modest
proposals about the future of ESA law and policy in Congress, the agencies
and the courts.
First, in Congress I expect more of the same, which is to say very little.
True, Congress has cloaked efforts to exempt some federal agency actions
147. See 8 Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. Rev. (Summer 1993) (back cover quote of Bruce Babbitt
taken from an interview in the July 8, 1993 issue of Rolling Stone).
148. See 16 Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. Rev. (Fall 2001) (back cover quote of Gale Norton taken
from a March 19, 2001 speech).
149. In a recent "Google" search I found over 1300 web pages discussing the ESA as an example of
communism.
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from ESA restrictions in high-profile issues such as national security and
catastrophic wildfires, but these are limited initiatives falling far short of
any direct structural changes to the ESA.150 As for the agencies, while the
Bush Administration has not wavered from Babbitt's HCP reforms, it has
yet to find a substantive theme it can call its own. Early in Gale Norton's
tenure as Interior Secretary, the agency cooked up what they have called the
"4 Cs," which stands for "conservation through cooperation, communica-
tion and consultation." The official word on what this means is as follows:
To foster a Nation of citizen stewards, Secretary Norton is
advancing a 4 C's philosophy-conservation through coop-
eration, communication and consultation. The Department
[of the Interior] is expanding the tools in the conservation
"toolbox" available to private landowners and federal land
mangers to enhance and achieve conservation. These tools
include over $500 million in conservation grants, including
$113 million proposed in FY 04 for the Cooperative Con-
servation Initiative (CCI), which includes funds for our
highly successful Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program,
our Coastal Program, and cooperative conservation chal-
lenge cost-share grants. Our Private Stewardship Grant
program and Landowner Incentive Program, founded on
initiatives envisioned by President Bush when he was Gov-
ernor of Texas, provide assistance to private landowners in
their voluntary efforts to protect threatened, imperiled and
endangered species.1
5 1
If anything, this approach has focused on fostering private land manage-
ment rather than simply federal acquisition of land and its reliance on states
as a principal channel for much of the grants initiative, features many envi-
ronmentalists have praised.152 Yet, while the agency has put the grant pro-
grams into place, 53 results thus far in terms of grant dollars actually paid
have been of minimal consequence. 154 It is too early to tell whether this
150. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 117 Stat.
1392 (2003).
151. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Strengthening Citizen Stewardship and Cooperative Con-
servation, http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/conservation.html (accessed April 21, 2004).
152. See Michael J. Bean, Missed Opportunities for Incentive-Based Conservation, Endangered
Species & Wetlands Rep., May 2003, at 6 ("for the most part, the environmental community acknowl-
edged the desirability of initiatives such as these").
153. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Private Stewardship Program: Grants and Other Assistance
for Private Landowners, http://endangered.FWS.gov/grants/private-stewardship.html (accessed No-
vember 4, 2003); U.S. Fish 7 Wildlife Service, Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund
(Section 6) Grants to States and Territories, http://endangered.FWS.gov/grants/sec6_rfp.html (accessed
November 4, 2003).
154. See Bean, supra n. 152, at 6-7 (discussing the lack of actual spending in either of the grant
programs as of May 2003); Dean Scott, Bush Administration Gets Mixed Reviews On Agreements for
Voluntary Conservation, 34 Env. Rep. (BNA) 2304 (2003) (reporting that, according to Michael Bean,
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manifestation of the 4 Cs will achieve the status of truly innovative reform
of the ESA or that of a failed experiment.
Lastly, I fear that in the courts, the likely trend is that of increasing mi-
cro-management of FWS and NMFS under Section 4, and of other federal
agencies under Section 7(a)(2). As noted above, litigation leading to court-
ordered decision deadlines under Section 4, especially overdesignations of
critical habitat, has engulfed the agency and its listing budget. Citizen suits
alleging federal agency violations of consultation duties were frequent as
early as the 1993 NR& E issue,155 and have only grown in number. Each
year for the past six years I compiled an annual review of ESA cases for the
American Bar Association, 156 and each year I must be more selective in
deciding which Section 4 and Section 7(a)(2) cases to discuss from the
growing number in both categories.
Whichever way the ESA's future unfolds in these three legal and policy
forums, what I find remarkable about the statute is that, while the themes
remain the same, the law of the ESA continues to be dynamic and relevant.
It is a statute that touches many lives, human and otherwise, and manages
to evoke strong emotions. I have worked with it closely for twenty years,
and yet it continues to surprise me. I highly recommend it!
as of October 2003 "none of the [grant] recipients has yet to receive a check" in the private landowner
program).
155. See Eileen Sobeck, Enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, 8 Nat. Resources & Envtl. L.
Rev. 30, 73 (Summer 1993) ("The vast majority of citizens' suits to date have involved claims that
federal agencies have violated the terms of section 7 of the Act.").
156. See, e.g., Environment, Energy, and Resources Law: The Year in Review 2002 213-19 (2003).
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